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Marsee: Direct Action Against Liability Insurer: A Legislative Approach f

NOTES
DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE LIABILITY INSURER: A
LEGISLATIVE APPROACH FOR FLORIDA*
In the substantial majority of American jurisdictions an injured plaintiff
seeking compensation from an insured but otherwise insolvent tortfeasor
faces numerous obstacles. As a prerequisite to recovery from the liability
insurer, the plaintiff must establish the liability of the insured in a separate
action.' If for some reason, such as lack of in personam jurisdiction, the tortfeasor proves inaccessible to suit, compensation from the insurer is precluded.2
It may be, therefore, that the plaintiff, often already low on resources, must
incur the additional expense of obtaining jurisdiction over the insolvent
3
tortfeasor in a distant forum.
Once over the jurisdictional hurdle, the plaintiff faces other obstacles.
Despite the fact that the action against the insured is probably being defended
by the insurance company's attorney, the plaintiff must assiduously avoid
reference at trial to liability insurance or risk reversal of his judgment on
appeal.4 After a judgment is obtained against the insured, the plaintiff may
need to seek satisfaction in a second action against the insurer. 5 If the
insured, through negligence, lack of cooperation, or failure to give notice
has provided the insurer with a sufficient policy defense, the plaintiff's action
against the insolvent insured will have been to no avail.6 It is not surprising
*EDITOR'S NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize

as the outstanding note submitted in the summer 1970 quarter.
1. 8 J. APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAw AND PRAcrcE §4851, at 252-53 (1962). This was the
law in Florida prior to the recent case of Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (1969). See
Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936); Thompson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 199 So.
2d 113 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Hayes v. Thomas, 161 So. 2d 545 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
2. See James, Necessary and Indispensable Parties, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 68, 75-76 (1963).
3. See id.
4. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENc E §282 (a) (3d ed. 1940). In some cases inadvertent reference
to insurance at trial has been held cured by proper jury instructions. Carls Markets, Inc. v.
Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 793 (Fla. 1953); Crowell v. Fink, 167 So. 2d 614, 615 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1964).
5. 8 J. APPLEMAN, note 1 supra §4851. This was the decisional law in Florida prior to
Shingleton v. Bussey. See Peerless v. Sheehan, 194 So. 2d 285 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Quarrier, 175 So. 2d 83 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Conley v. Singleton,
171 So. 2d 65 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965). Several states provide statutorily for such subrogationtype actions. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §66-4001 (1966); CAL. INS. CODE §11580 (West 1955);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175 §§112-13 (1959; N.Y. INs. LAw §167 (McKinney 1966);
OHso REv. CODE ANN. §3926.06 (Baldwin 1964); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §27-7-2 (1968); TENN.
CODE ANN. §59-1223 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. §38.1-380 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. §17D4-12 (f)
(1966). Inasmuch as some authorities are of the opinion that the judgment creditor has a
right of subrogation in any event, 8 J. APPLEMAN, note I supra, §4831, it is questionable
whether such statutes grant any rights not already possessed by judgment creditors against
intransigent insurers. Note, Judicial Creation of Direct Actions Against Automobile Liability
Insurers: Shingleton v. Bussey, 23 VAND. L. REv. 631, 635 (1970).
6. 8 J. APPLEmAN, note 1 supra, §4851.
[304]
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that such obstacles to compensation may act as a strong inducement to
settlement out of court.7
In order to insure compensation for plaintiffs, reduce the need for piecemeal litigation, and disclose insurers' interest in litigation a few states have
permitted injured parties to sue insurers directly without first establishing
the liability of the insured.8
Immediately following a legislative rejection of such "direct action,"9
Florida took the somewhat unique step of judicially establishing it,-O thereby
creating a multitude of unanswered questions"i and no small degree of
confusion.12 Other than by years of litigation, the unresolved problems and
confusion can only be minimized by carefully drafted direct-action legislation.
This note will examine direct-action statutes and their major problems;' 8
it will also propose direct-action legislation for Florida based on the experiences
14
of other direct-action jurisdictions.
7. Especially where such settlement is unfair or inadequate, this might also appear
violative of at least the spirit of FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §21: "The courts shall be open
to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay."
8. Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74
HARv. L. Rav. 357 (1960).
9. Direct-action legislation was introduced in both houses of the 1969 Florida legislature. Fla. S. 468 (1969) was recommended unfavorably and tabled May 6, 1969. Fla. H.R.
1120 (1969) died in committee June 6, 1969. A similar bill, Fla. H.R. 552 (1949), providing
for impleading of the insurer as a defendant, failed passage in 1949.
10. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969), commented on in 22 U. FLA. L. REV.
145 (1969), held that in light of prevailing public policy, automobile liability insurance
policies should be construed as quasi-third-party beneficiary contracts in favor of injured
members of the public and, notwithstanding "no-action" clauses therein, a direct cause of
action inured to such third-party beneficiary at the time he became entitled to sue the
insured. For other cases that have permitted joinder of the insurer, see Dunn v. Jones, 148
Kan. 218, 53 P.2d 918 (1936); James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 48 N.W.2d 692 (1950) ; Vanderford v. Smith, 285 S.C. 448, 111 S.E.2d 777 (1960); Watts v. Baker, 288 S.C. 446, 105 S.E.2d 605
(1958). The effect of the statutes or ordinances in these cases was to require common
carriers to insure against their negligence. The statutes were construed to make injured
members of the public third-party beneficiaries under the insurance policy.

A relatively recent line of New York decisions has permitted direct action against the
insurer on a garnishment theory, where the insured was not amenable to process. Minichello
v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968); Barker v. Smith, 290 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 805, 234 N.E.2d 669 (1967); Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 812, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
I1. Comment, Judicial Creation of Direct Action Against Automobile Liability Insurers,

22 U. FLA. L. REv. 145 (1969).
12. A notable area of confusion has been whether severance of insurance issues for
separate trial is discretionary or compulsory. Compare Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 718
(Fla. 1969), with Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 287 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1970).
13. A detailed discussion of each of the many problem areas created by direct action
is not attempted here. Only those areas most essential to the drafting of a workable
direct-action statute are treated at length. Considerations requiring only short comment
will be treated in footnotes as they arise. One notable victim of selectivity has been direct
action as it affects conflicts-of-law. For a discussion of this area see Note, supra note 8,
at 374-92.
14. The text of that suggested legislation is set forth in appendices A and B [hereinafter cited as Suggested Florida Direct Action Statute (SFDAS)].
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Direct action can be best understood in terms of four sometimes countervailing public policies: (1) insuring just compensation to injured members
of the public, (2) avoiding multiplicity of litigation, (3) preventing excessive
judgments, and (4) protecting the insurer's and insured's freedom to contract.
The emergence of direct action has been dominated by a balancing, both
conscious and unconscious, of these public policies.
Liability insurance was for many years written solely for the benefit of
the insured. 15 If for some reason, such as insolvency, the insured was unable
to satisfy the injured party's judgment, there could be no recovery from the
insurer.16 Gradually, however, courts and legislatures began to view liability
insurance as a public-protection and loss-allocation vehicle."T
This changing attitude manifested itself in the decisional law that
utilized the established distinction between two basic types of risk insurance:
indemnity policies, which insure against loss actually sustained by the insured;
and liability policies, which insure against the liability for loss.' 8 Where
insurance policies provided for settlement or control of litigation by the
insurer, although otherwise purporting to be indemnity policies, courts
tended to regard them as liability contracts binding upon the insurer as soon
as judgment was obtained against the insured. 9 Where a contract was
ambiguous, it was construed as a contract of liability rather than indemnity.20
To make certain their contracts would be construed as indemnity contracts, insurance companies began inserting "no-action-until-payment
clauses."21 Legislatures responded with statutes making the insurer liable
regardless of the insured's insolvency or bankruptcy22 and requiring that
23
liability contracts waive such defenses.
15. See, e.g., Bain v. Atkins, 181 Mass. 240, 63 N.E. 414 (1902).
16. Note, supra note 8, at 357.
17. This attitude is increasingly prevalent. See Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d (Fla.
1969); Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 208 N.E.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1965);
Musmed v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 496 (Ct. App. La. 1962); Symposium,
Changes for Automobile Claims, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 361.
18. 8 J. APPLEMAN, note I supra, §4831; Comment, The Insurer as Party Defendant in
Auto Accident Cases, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 688, 690 (1953).
19. Stephens v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 135 Mich. 189, 190, 97 N.W. 686, 687 (1903).
The clause in this case provided: "The indemnity hereby provided for shall not be payable
until the loss or damage has been adjusted and settled by the Company ....
" Anoka
Lumber Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 63 Minn. 286, 65 N.W. 353 (1895).
20. See, e.g., Michel v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 82 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1936).
21. This clause barred action against the insurer until loss had actually been sustained
by the insured by reason of payment of a judgment against the insured. See Kipkey v.
Casualty Ass'n, 255 Mich. 408, 238 N.W. 239 (1931); Elliott v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 201 Wis.
445, 230 N.W. 87 (1930).
22. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §38-175 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. §379.195 (1968);
VA. CODE ANN. §38.1-388 (1950).
23. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. §1000 (Smith-Hurd 1965); R.I GEN. LAws ANN. §27-7-1 (1968).
As a part of the direct-action legislation introduced in the 1969 Florida Legislature (see note
9 supra) the insertion of insolvency defenses in Florida policies would have been prohibited.
Such a prohibition would seem necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of direct action.
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Today, bowing to the legislative trend, liability insurers have uniformly
discarded insolvency defenses by policy provision.2 A companion provision,
however, prohibits any action against the insurer until the insured's liability
is established by judgment.25 The courts and legislatures of most states,
apparently feeling that the opposing public policies are at this point in
equilibrium, seem satisfied with this solution and have uniformly recognized
2
such no-action clauses as valid. 6
Direct-action jurisdictions, on the other hand, have rejected this solution
and, in seeking a more suitable balance, have allowed direct suit against the
insurer prior to a judgment against the insured. 27 Some direct-action jurisdictions, however, have been willing to apply direct action concepts more
extensively than others.
Louisiana 28 and Puerto Rico 29 have enacted the broadest of such statutes,
allowing direct action in all tort litigation. On a more limited scale,
Wisconsin permits direct action only in cases involving automobile liability.8 0
South Carolina, 31 Georgia, 32 Oklahoma, 3 and Vermont 4 provide for direct
action against the insurers of various classes of carriers for hire. The approach
taken by Arkansas allows direct action only in instances where the tortfeasor
is a tort-immune organization3 5 or where the claim against the insured arises
36
outside the United States.
Since Florida does seem to continue the distinction between liability and indemnity policies,
see Da Costa v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 226 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1969), it is possible that insurers
might use the insolvency clauses to avoid the effects of direct action. See Appendix B infra,
for the text of the insolvency defense prohibition introduced into the 1969 Florida
Legislature. That prohibition is recommended herein as a companion to any direct action
statute Florida might enact.
24. The standard policy used by casualty insurers on a nationwide basis provides:
"Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the insured's estate shall not relieve the
company of any of its obligations hereunder." Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy:
Some of the Changes, 33 Irs. COUNSEL J. 223, 232 (1966).
25. The standard policy provides: "No action shall lie against the company . . . until
the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by
judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured,
the claimant and the company." Id.
26. 8 J. APPLEMAN, note I supra, §4861. See also authorities cited note 5 supra.
27. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§66-3250, 66-3244 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. §68-612 (1967); LA. RIv.
STAT. ANN. §22:655 (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §27-7-2 (1968); S.C. CODE ANN.
§10-702 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. §260.11 (Supp. 1969); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 26, §2003 (Supp.
1968).
28. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §22:655 (Supp. 1970).
29. P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 26, §2003 (Supp. 1968).
30. W s. STAT. ANN. §260.11 (Supp. 1969).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. §10-702 (1962).
32. GA. CODE ANN. §68-612 (1967) provides: "If a policy of indemnity insurance is
given in lieu of bond, it shall be permissible to join the motor carrier and the insurance
carrier in the same action whether arising in tort or contract."
33. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §169 (Supp. 1969-1970).
34. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§842, 882 (1967).
35. ARK. STAT. ANN. §66-3240 (1967). This statute has been held inapplicable to private
individuals. Savage v. Spicer, 235 Ark. 946, 362 S.V.2d 668 (1962).

36.

ARK. STAT. ANN.

§66-3244 (1966).
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Statutes in Alabama,37 Kansas, 38 and New Mexico, s9 while not expressly
permitting direct action, have been construed to do so. The courts of two
states, California ° and North Dakota, 41 have interpreted city ordinances
requiring taxi companies to carry liability insurance as allowing direct action
42
against such insurers.
Rhode Island's statute affords the clearest example of the balancing of
public policy behind direct-action legislation. This statute permits direct
action where service of process cannot be obtained upon the insured, but
expressly prohibits joinder of the insurer in all other situations.43 In so doing,
the state evidences both a recognition of the desirability of direct action in
some situations and a basic distrust of the concept in general. With the
possible exception of Louisiana, this ambivalence threads throughout all
direct-action legislation.
Three arguments have been advanced in opposition to direct action:
(1) causes ex contractu and ex delicto cannot be maintained in one action, 4"
(2) the insurer is not the real party in interest,4 5 and (8) revealing the presence of a "deep-pocketed" insurer at trial will result in augmented plaintiffs'
verdicts, both in number and size.46 Although the first two objections are
more relevant to a discussion of judicially created direct action, 47 the third
is of paramount importance in the area of direct-action statutes. So strong
has been this fear of increased awards that courts have held reference to
liability insurance at trial to be reversible error.4 8 Legislatures have statutorily
prohibited such reference,49 and one state has even expressly made mere
37. ALA. CODE tit. 36, §74(62)- (83) (Supp. 1968), construed in American Southern Ins.
Co. v. Dime Taxi Serv., Inc., 275 Ala. 51, 151 So. 2d 783 (1963).
38. KAN. STAT. ANN. §66-1, 128 (1964), construed in Sterling v. Haetenstein, 185 Kan. 50,
341 P.2d 90 (1959).
39. N.M. STAT. ANN. §64-27-49 (Supp. 1969), construed in Deeg v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1960); Breeden v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 376 (1954).
40. Butler v. Sequeira, 100 Cal. App. 2d 143, 223 P.2d 48 (1950). See Rupley v. Huntsman, 159 Cal. App. 2d 307, 324 P.2d 19 (1958).
41. James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 43 N.W.2d 692 (1950).
42. In North Dakota this decision was reached notwithstanding a statute to the
contrary. N.D. CENT. CODE §39-16-11 (1960), as amended, §49-18-33 (Supp. 1969); Note,
supra note 5, at 634.
43. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §27-7-2 (1968).
44. See Artille v Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936) overruled by Shingleton v.
Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969); Alpin v. Smith, 197 Iowa 388, 197 N.W. 316 (1924).
45. See Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1952); cf. Hurley v. Finley, 6 Ill. App. 2d
23, 126 N.E.2d 513 (Ct. App. 1955); State ex rel. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weber,
364 Mo. 1159, 273 S.W.2d 318 (1954).
46. See Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 793 (Fla. 1953); Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 123-27, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524, 530-33 (2d Dep't 1955);
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE

§168 (1954).

47. See Comment, note 11 supra.
48. See authorities cited in note 4 supra.
49. See FLA. STAT. §455.06 (1969) (waives governmental immunity to the extent of
liability insurance for certain state agencies and prohibits the suggestion of the existence
of insurance at trial); IDAHO CODE ANN. §41-3505 (1961) (waiver of governmental immunity);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §40-4402 (Supp. 1969) (waiver of governmental immunity); N.M.
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reference to liability insurance at trial a ground for mistrial.
Although there is some evidence that reference to liability insurance at
trial does affect verdict size, 5' it does not follow that direct action will
necessarily result in such increases. The vulnerability of this prophylactic
argument (that shielding jurors from the knowledge of the insurer's presence
will prevent increased verdicts) lies in the fact that a variety of ways already
exists in which the presence of liability insurance may come to the jury's
attention. 52 It may be revealed in the voir dire examination of the jurors,5 3
in questioning a witness for bias,5 4 or by inadvertent reference at trial. 55
Moreover, juries doubtless assume the presence of insurance in areas such as
automobile litigation where liability insurance is compulsory or widespread.5 6
One potential of direct action is that it may actually reduce the number
and size of plaintiffs' verdicts. 57 It has been argued that direct action promotes
intellectual honesty at trial, makes it possible to instruct the jury as to the
true function of liability insurance,58 and prevents the possibility of juries

STAT. ANN. §64-25-9 (1953)

(waiver of governmental immunity); N.D. CENT. CODE §49-18-33
(Supp. 1969) (joinder of insurer with common carriers prohibited and comment concerning
existence of insurance denied in action against common carrier); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252, §19 (1969-1970 Supp.) (waiver of governmental immunity).
50. NEV. REV. STAT. §41A90 (1965).
51.

Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959):

"Where the defendant disclosed that he had no insurance the average award of all verdicts
was $33,000. Where defendant disclosed that he had insurance but there was no objection,
the average award rose to $37,000. Where, however, the defendant said he had insurance
and there was an objection and an instruction to disregard, the average award rose to
$46,000 .... " These same jury studies, though inconclusive, also indicate that absence of
insurance may cause the jury to return an inadequate award. Note, The Liability Insurer
as a Real Party in Interest: Proposed Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MINN. L. REv. 784, 788 n.33 (1957).
52. See 2 J. WIGzuoRE, EvIDENCE §282 (a) (3d ed. 1940).

53. Id. at 134-35. See Ryan v. Noble, 95 Fla. 830, 116 So. 766 (1928). See generally Kabb,
Insurance Questions in Voir Dire, 17 Ctva.-M RM.
L. REv. 504 (1968). For a Florida case
subsequent to Shingleton v. Bussey dealing with insurance on voir dire, see Sutton v.

Gomez, 234 So. 2d 725 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
54. 21 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAaricEs §12831 (1962); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 52, at 135.
55. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 52, at 135. The fact of insurance may also be admissible
as it relates to questions of: (1) ownership and control of the automobile or instrumentality

involved; (2) the existence and scope of an employment relationship, or both; (3) charitable
or governmental immunity waivers; and (4) payment of attorneys' fees. Stopher, Should a
Change Be Made in Discovery Rules To Permit Inquiry as to Limits of Liability Insurance?,
INS. COUNSEL J. 53, 56 (1968).
56. 2 J. WimfOR, supra note 52, at 146; Lassiter, Direct Actions . . . Against the
Insurer, 1949 Ins. L. 1. 411, 416.

35

57. Proponents of direct action have noted that Louisiana and Wisconsin, both directaction jurisdictions, are among the lowest verdict areas in the United States. M. BErsu, THE
MORE ADEQUATE AWARD 2-3 (1952). This argument is weakened somewhat, however, by the
fact that Louisiana allows appellate review on questions of fact, LA. CONST. art. 7, §§10 (6),
27 and that Wisconsin is a comparative negligence jurisdiction, Wis. STAT. ANN. §331.045
(1958). These peculiarities could contribute to the lower awards in these jurisdictions.
58. See Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
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becoming antagonized by the insurance companies' secretive behavior.59 It
has also been contended that once defendants learn how to utilize direct
action, it may serve as a weapon to prevent mulcting of insurers and insureds
by unworthy plaintiffs.60
For these reasons direct action would probably not impose as undue a
burden on insurers as proponents of the prophylactic argument might imagine.
Moreover, use of this concept might avoid the occasional unduly low verdict
that results when a jury, without knowledge of insurance, proves overly
sympathetic toward the defendant.61
Direct action also allows the injured party a readily accessible source of
compensation where jurisdiction over the insured proves difficult or impossible
to obtain.62 Service of process may be had upon the tortfeasor's insurance
company either through the insurer's "minimum contacts" with the directaction state or through the state's long-arm statute. 63 This would seem consonant with the public policy of affording injured persons the greatest possible protection, yet it would not be unduly burdensome to the insurer. The
insurer will often have offices and resources within the direct-action state and
usually will be able to defend the injured's suit in the direct-action state as
readily as in any distant state wherein the insured might be located.64 Indeed,
in light of the fact that the accident giving rise to the action will likely have
occurred within the direct-action state, 65 the insurer might experience difficulty
in obtaining witnesses and presenting evidence at a trial in any other place.
Direct action also has the advantage of reducing piece-meal litigation.66
Since, under direct action, the liability of the insured and the policy defenses
of the insurer are normally litigated in one proceeding,67 there is little need
59. Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74
HARv. L. REV. 357, 358 (1960).
60. Symposium, Changes for Automobile Claims, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 361, 572. See Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 718 (Fla. 1969): "[A] candid admission at trial of the existence
of insurance coverage, the policy limits of the same and an otherwise aboveboard revelation
of the interest of an insurer in the outcome of the recovery action against insured should
be more beneficial to insurers in terms of diminishing their overall policy judgment payments than the questionable 'ostrich head in the sand' approach which may often mislead
juries to think insurance coverage is greater than it is."
61. Note, supra note 59, at 359. See Note, note 51 supra.
62. See Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465 (1933). Rhode Island extends
direct action only to those cases where the injured party is unable to obtain jurisdiction over
the tortfeasor. R. I. GEN. LAws §27-7-2 (1968).
63. See text accompanying notes 173-191 infra. See generally MacDonald, Direct Action
Against Liability Insurance Companies, 1957 Wis. L. REV. 612.
64. Note, supra note 59, at 362.
65. See text accompanying notes 150-172 infra; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:655 (Supp.
1970); VIs. STAT. ANN. §260.11 (Supp. 1969).
66. Note, The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 22 LA. L. Rav. 243, 246 (1961). For two
cases epitomizing the multiplicity of actions and undue delay that can occur in the absence
of direct action, see Bettinger v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 213 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1954)
(required two lawsuits and three years for a final determination); Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Grasso, 186 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1951) (required three lawsuits and six years).
67. Note, note 66 supra. But see Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163
(Fla. 1970).
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for multiplicity of action.s Court economy will be promoted, and poor plaintiffs will not be denied just compensation because of a financial inability
to pursue remedies in two successive actions. 69 The insurer also benefits from
reduced litigation since insurance companies, in the absence of direct action,
are often forced to defend the insured on the basis of liability even though
policy defenses are available7 0
Since reference to insurance at trial is openly allowed and controlled,71
another reason advanced to justify direct action is that new trials, based on
technical errors caused by quibbling over exclusionary rules of evidence,
are reduced in number.7 2 The insurer is thereby denied the chance for victory
on error and retrial,73 but the determination of cases on their merits is
promoted.
Unless the legislature should now choose to enact anti-direct-action
legislation, the question of whether Florida will permit direct action against
the insurer is rendered moot by the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Shingleton v. Bussey. 7' In light of the developments leading to the emergence
of direct action procedure7 5 and the continuing trend toward viewing liability
insurance as a quasi-public system for protecting injured persons, 76 direct
action is not a radical innovation. 7 Judicial development of this concept,
however, is a slow procedure, and the numerous complex questions raised by
direct action can result in confusion and a failure to fully achieve the
68. It should be noted also that, since direct action enables all the issues to be litigated
in one action, declaratory judgments may not be allowed. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Simpson, 238 Wis. 550, 300 N.W. 367 (1941).
69. See note 66 supra for situations that would promote undue financial burdens on
plaintiffs with meager resources. Often, a plaintiff, faced with the necessity of obtaining
a judgment against an insolvent tortfeasor in order to reach the insurer, might well decide
to settle instead.
70. In non-direct-action jurisdictions, the insurer is sometimes faced with a dilemma.
If the company defends the action against the insured, its policy defenses may be held
waived. If it does not defend the action against the insured, it may be bound by the judgment rendered there. See Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197
N.E. 75 (1935); Note, Liability Insurance Policy Defenses and the Duty To Defend, 68
HARv. L. Rxv. 1436, 1442-45 (1955).
71. See text accompanying notes 80-116 infra.
72. 2 J. WumGMoRx, supra note 52, at 146-47.
73. The tendency of courts to hold reference to insurance at trial non-prejudicial where
proper instructions have been given has already reduced somewhat the insurer's opportunity
for retrial. See Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953); Crowell v. Fink, 167
So. 2d 614 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
74. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
75. See Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 386, 208 N.E. 2d 12, 20 (Ct. App.
1965), cited in Shingleton v. Bussey, passim, for a recognition of automobile liability insurance's importance today: "Automobile insurance has taken an important position in the
modem world. It is no longer a private contract merely between two parties. .

.

. Many

persons injured and disabled from automobile accidents would become public charges were
it not for financial assistance received from the insurance companies." The basic argument
would seem to apply with equal force to all liability insurance.
76.

See generally Symposium, note 60 supra.

77. Louisiana first enacted the predecessor to LA. REv.
in 1930 (La. Acts 1930, No. 55).
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purposes for which direct action was created.78 It is submitted, therefore,
that the Florida legislature, after carefully taking into account the necessary
balancing of public policies involved, should now enact direct-action legislation and set forth operational procedures and limitations.79
REFERENCE TO INSURANCE AT TRIAL:

DiscovERY

In the absence of direct action, any reference at trial to either the
existence or limits of liability insurance is, with only a few exceptions,80
uniformly prohibited."' This results not only from the fear of augmented
verdicts, but also from the widely held view that the question of insurance
is irrelevant.8 2 The two questions for determination at trial are the insured's
liability and damages, and the fact of insurance is felt to have no probative
s
bearing on these issues8
Under direct action the situation obviously changes. Where the insurer
is a party defendant, the basic questions for determination are the liability
of the insured, damages, and the liability of the insurer under the terms of
the liability contract.8 4 Clearly, the existence of coverage is relevant.8 5 The
more perplexing question involves the admissibility of policy limitss6
It has been contended that policy limits should not be introduced, 7 since
except for punitive damage situations, policy limits bear no relevance to
78. See comment, Judicial Creation of Direct Action Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 145 (1969).

79. See generally SFDAS, Appendix A.
80. See Stopher, note 55 supra.

81. 8 J. APPLEMAN, note 54 supra, §4861. For two earlier Florida cases, see Carls Markets,
Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953); Crowell v. Fink, 167 So. 2d 614 (1st D.C.A. Fla.

(1964).
82. See, eg., Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541, 18 N.W. 2d 582 (1945).
83. See, e.g., Stopher, note 55 supra.
84. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Burchard, 25 Wis. 2d 288, 130 N.W.2d 866
(1964). Compare Degelos v. Fidelity 8&Cas. Co., 313 F.2d 809 (1963), with Musmeci v.
American Auto. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 496 (Ct. App. La. 1962) and Sheehan v. Lewis, 218 Wis.
588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935).
85. But see Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 165 (Fla. 1970), in which
the Florida supreme court states: "The existence or amount of insurance coverage has no
bearing on the issues of liability and damages, and such evidence should not be considered
by the jury." This decision appears to reject in part the court's earlier rationale in Shingle.
ton v. Bussey, and to a great extent emasculates that decision. It is submitted that the
Shingleton decision is the better reasoned of the two opinions and that, in any Florida
direct-action legislation, reference to the existence of liability insurance should be allowed
at trial. However, such reference should be subject to the trial court's discretion with regard
to the manner of its introduction. See SFDAS Appendix A, 8.
86. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 718 (Fla. 1969), contains language strongly
suggesting that policy limits are to be admissible: "[A] candid admission at trial of the
existence of insurance coverage... [and] ... the policy limits of the same ...... FL. STAT.
§455.06 (1969), which waives governmental immunity for certain agencies to the extent of
liability coverage, prohibits even the suggestion of the existence of insurance at trial.
87. Ferrero,

An Advocate Examines the Ramifications of Shingleton

v.

Bussey,

93 J. ACADEMY FLA. TRIAL LAwYERS, Nov. 1969, at 2, 10. Contra, United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Superior Court, 85 P.R.R. 124 (1962), holding that unless the insurer estab-
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questions of the insured's liability, the damages, or to the liability of the
insurer under the policy.a8 The situation is analogized to the prohibition
against delving into the financial status of the tortfeasor8s However, some
courts have stressed that liability insurance is unlike other assets in that it
was purchased for the sole purpose of protection in the event of litigation. 90
Those who favor admitting policy limits at trial apparently do so with
a faith in the sophistication of the modem jury and in the interest of
intellectual honesty at trial.91 They are also aware that juries, made aware
of the existence of insurance in the case and then blindfolded as to the extent
of coverage, may return, by guessing, both unduly high and unduly low
awards. 92 When the jury guesses high, the interest of not only the insurer, but
also the insured, may be seriously affected. 9s It has been suggested, however,
that in Kentucky, where inquiry into coverage limits is permitted, 94 there is
often a definite resemblance between verdict size and policy limits.95
Although much of the argument concerning the evidential admissibility
of policy limits is conjectural, it would seem wisest to exclude such reference.
First, the many compelling reasons for joining the insurer as a defendant
do not apply when considering the admissibility of policy limits. 96 Neither
the jurisdictional advantages of direct action nor the elimination of piecemeal litigation would be furthered, and where policy limits are low, juries
might be inclined to return unduly inadequate verdicts, thus defeating the
direct-action purpose of protecting the public.
A simple solution would be to treat the extent of the company's liability
in a manner similar to the way set-offs are presently handled in Florida. 97
lishes at trial its limits of liability under the terms of the policy, the limits are presumed
to be coextensive with the judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(2), as amended in 1970, although
providing for discovery of insurance existence and contents, provides: "Information concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence at
trial."
88. Ferrero, note 87 supra.
89. E.g., State ex rel. Hersman v. District Ct., 142 Mont. 139, 143-44, 381 P.2d 799, 801
(1963).
90. 4 J MooRE, FEMERAL PRACTICE §26.16[3], at 1191 (2d ed. 1966). See, e.g., Johanek v.
Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961); Terry v. Fisher, 12 I1. 2d 231, 145 N.E. 2d 588 (1957);
Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W. 2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
91. See Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969); Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d
189, 429 P. 2d 39 (1967).
92. See authorities cited in note 51 supra.
93. It is assumed here that both the insured and insurer are either codefendants or
that the party not involved in the action will be bound by principles of res judicata or
collateral estoppel. See text accompanying notes 196-220 infra.
94. Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W. 2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
95. Stopher, supra note 55, at 59.
96. Ferrero, supra note 87, at 10.
97. FLA. STAT. §768.041 (2), (3) (1969) : "At trial if any defendant shows the court that
the plaintiff ...

has delivered a release or covenant not to sue

. . .

in partial satisfaction of

the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment
to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and
enter judgment accordingly. The fact of such a release or covenant not to sue . . . shall
not be made known to the jury."
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Also, where the limits of coverage are themselves in dispute, severance of
that issue would be possible. 98
Since evidence concerning the existence of insurance will be allowed under
direct action, questions involving the manner of its introduction become
important in that undue emphasis upon the existence of an insurer could
prove prejudicial. In both Louisiana and Wisconsin the fact of insurance is
admissible. 99 However, decisions in both jurisdictions indicate that undue
emphasis on such evidence may be prejudicial to the defendant. 100 On the
other hand, it is possible that excessive emphasis on the fact that the jury
ultimately pays the cost of the verdict, by increased insurance rates, may
prejudice the plaintiff's case.'' This problem could best be controlled by
02
legislation providing for the exercise of judicial discretion in this area.
A related question is that of jury instruction. Assuming the policy limits
have not been introduced in evidence, it would seem that absent some query
by the jury with respect to policy limits, no special instruction would be
necessary.0 3 Where the jury does ask a question concerning policy limits,
the court could instruct the jury that questions of liability and damages
should be determined without regard to policy limits.04
Necessarily intertwined with issues relating to admissibility is the question
of discovery: May the plaintiff discover the existence of the tortfeasor's insurance company and the policy limits or both? o5 Even in the absence of

98. The Florida supreme court, in Shingleton v. Bussey, 228 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1969),
suggested severance, and has since expressly held in Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237
So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970), that severance may be granted. It is submitted that under direct
action legislation, reference to policy limits at trial should be restricted to cases where such
limits are dearly in dispute. In such cases the courts should have discretion to sever such
6, 8. For situations where policy limits
issues for separate trials. See SFDAS, Appendix A.,
may be in issue see Wingerter v. Maryland Cas. Co., 813 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1963); Royal
Transit v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 845 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 35 U.S. 844
(1948).
99. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 823, 826 (5th Cir. 1960); Vuchetich
v. General Cas. Co., 270 Wis. 552, 555-56, 72 N.W 2d 389, 891-92 (1955); Roeske v. Schmitt,
266 Wis. 557, 572-78, 64 N.W. 2d 894, 402-03 (1954).
100. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 828, 826 (5th Cir. 1960)
(dictum); Roeske v. Schmitt, 266 Wis. 557, 571-73, 64 N.W. 2d 394, 401-03 (1954) (dictum);
Doepke v. Reimer, 217 Wis. 49, 54-55, 258 NAV. 845, 847 (1935) (dictum).
101. Cf. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960). But cf.
Doepke v. Reimer, 217 Wis. 49, 258 N.W. 845 (1935).
102. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 8.
103. Ferrero, supra note 87, at 11.
104. Id.
105. A poll of Florida circuit court judges, taken shortly after the decision in Shingleton
v. Bussey indicated that 97 out of 97 judges were allowing discovery of the insurance company's name, and 86 out of 98 judges were allowing discovery of policy limits. Ferrero,
supra note 87, at 12. In a subsequent supreme court decision, discovery has been held
available under Florida's judicial direct action procedure, Beta Eta House Corp. v.
Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970). However, the decision does not limit discovery to
either coverage or limits, and the language suggests that either would be subject to discovery. The Fourth District Court of Appeal for Florida has extended discovery to both
coverage and limits. Duran v. McPherson, 23 So. 2d 689 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
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direct action there is a clear divergence of opinion among commentators0 8
and federal 07 and state courts08 with respect to such discoverability. Its
opponents point out that discovery has as its purposes: (1) the narrowing of
issues, (2) the obtaining of evidence, and (8) the securing of information
leading to evidence. 09 Discovery of insurance coverage and limits, they maintain, falls into none of these categories. 1 0 Proponents of discovery argue that
whatever helps to determine the dispute is relevant,"' that discovery aids the
plaintiff in a realistic appraisal of his case," 12 and that allowing such discovery
3
will promote settlements."1
If relevancy is the key, under direct action there would seem to be no
bar to discovery of the existence of insurance and policy terms. Since the
insurer's liability under the insurance contract is at issue and the insurer is
a party defendant in every sense of the word," 4 the fact of insurance is relevant
and should be discoverable. Moreover, two major purposes of direct action
are served by discovery of the insurer's interest. By appraising his chances
of recovery at an early stage the plaintiff may, upon finding no insurer involved, save himself expensive and wasteful litigation."'"
The discovery of policy limits poses a more difficult problem. If such limits
are not to be introduced at trial, there can be no claim of relevance to support
their discovery. Here again, however, such information could aid the injured
party in appraising his case, thereby aiding in settlements or the avoidance
of futile litigation." 6

106. See 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTzHOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDURE, RuLEs
EDITION 647.1 (1961); Fournier, Pre-Trial Discovery of Insurance Coverage and Limits, 28
FORDHAMr L. REuv. 215 (1959); Frank, Discovery and Insurance Coverage, 1959 INS. L.J. 281.
107. Compare Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966) and Hodges v. Heap, 40
F.R.D. 314 (D.N.D. 1966), with Di Biase v. Rederi, 32 F.R.D. 41 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) and
Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (WD. Pa. 1962).
108. Compare Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957), with Maddox v. Grauman
265 S.W. 2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
109. Stopher, Should a Change Be Made in Discovery Rules To Permit Inquiry as to
Limits of Liability Insurance?, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 53, 55 (1968).
110. Id. See Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Comment, Civil ProcedurePretrial Discovery of Existence and Amount of Defendant's Liability Insurance Policy, 20
S.C.L. REv. 85, 92 (1968).
111. Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 191, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967).
112. People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 239, 145 N.E. 2d 588, 593 (1957).
113. Id.; Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966). As amended in 1970, FED. R.
Civ. P. 26 (2) now makes the existence and contents of liability insurance subject to discovery.
The change in the Rule is said to reflect "a hope that knowledge of insurance limits will
lead to more realistic negotiation and thus to more settlements." C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
359 (2d ed. 1970). The Rule imposes the limitation, however, that "an application for
insurance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement."
114. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1960).
115. It is submitted that under legislative direct action both policy coverage and limits
should be subject to discovery. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 8. However, it should be the
expressed legislative intent that discovery not be construed to extend to other assets held
by the insured. Id.
116. Id.
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A major question raised by the decision in Shingleton v. Bussey' 17 was
whether Florida's judicial direct action would be limited to automobile
liability cases. The language of the opinion is susceptible to interpretations
either favoring or negating such a limitation.11s Recently the question was
resolved' 1 9 in Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory"20 wherein the court held
that the principles announced in Shingleton were "applicable not only to
automobile liability insurance but also to other forms of liability insurance."221

In Wisconsin, direct action has been restricted to damages "caused by
the negligent operation, management, control, maintenance, use or defective
construction of a motor vehicle,' 22 apparently on the basis of the peculiar
importance of automobile liability insurance. Wisconsin regards such insurance as written, not for the protection of the insured, but for the protection
of a third-party beneficiary.123
It seems, however, that the reasons for allowing direct action in automobile
liability cases apply with equal force in other areas.124 The following arguments, which were advanced by Shingleton, are the major ones supporting
25
direct action generally:
(1) A party injured by the negligence of the insured is a third party
beneficiary for whose direct benefit the policy of liability insurance was
written.
(2) The insurance company actively participates in litigation and
thus is a real party in interest.
(3) An injured party may be adversely affected (by the policy
117. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
118. The Florida supreme court extensively cited Gathberg v. Nemerovski, 58 IM. App.
2d 372, 208 N.E.2d 12 (1965), on the importance of automobile liability insurance in society.
223 So. 2d 713, 715-16 (Fla. 1969). A medical malpractice case, Bergh v. Canadian Universal
Ins. Co., 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1968), was cited to emphasize the importance of direct action
to the injured litigant. 223 So. 2d 713, 719 (Fla. 1969). Immediately following the decision
in Shingleton v. Bussey a poll of circuit court judges indicated that, of 93 judges responding,
62 were permitting direct action in nonautomobile situations. Ferrero, supra note 87, at 12.
119. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970). Several district courts
of appeal had previously extended Shingleton to nonautomobile liability cases: Maxwell v.
Southern Am. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 763 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (homeowner's liability
insurance); Duran v. McPherson, 233 So. 2d 639 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1970) (professional liability
insurance); Shipman v. Kinderman, 232 So. 2d 21 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (medical malpractice); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 231 So. 2d 235 (3d D.C.A. 1970) (homeowner's
liability insurance); Ray v. Pfeiffer, 237 So. 2d 562 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (homeowner's
liability insurance).
120. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
121. Id. at 165.

122.

Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§260:11 (Supp. 1969).

123. Cf. Mueller v. American Indem. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 349, 120 N.W. 2d 89 (1963). This
view coincides with that expressed in Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
124. Ferrero, supra note 87, at 5-6.
125. Id. See Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
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breaches of the insured) if he cannot immediately align the insurer with
the insured.
(4) Every litigant has a right to an open, speedy and realistic
opportunity to pursue his right of an adequate remedy at law.
(5) It is desirable to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
(6) The maturity and sophistication of juries and the recent indication that jury verdicts are not increased by the injection of insurance into
cases mitigates the possible prejudice to the defendant, which is considered
the principal danger of direct action procedure.
All of these arguments are readily applicable to areas, such as medical malpractice, 126 where automobile insurance is not involved. 12 7 Since direct action
rejects the prophylactic argument (that direct action procedure will increase
verdict size) as a basis for excluding the insurer, there seems to be no rational
argument for restricting direct action to automobile cases. It is submitted that
direct action in Florida should be extended to all negligence actions.-as

CONsTrrTIoNALITY

Invalidation of the no-action clauses found in liability policies is the
heart of direct action. 29 Such invalidation has led to the contention that
direct-action legislation is an unconstitutional restraint upon the freedom
of the parties to contracL 30 Because of the state's interest in regulating
insurance, however, it has been held that such invalidation is within a
direct-action state's regulatory power.' 3 '
A more serious objection relates to the retroactive application of such
invalidation. A statute may be retrospective in nature even if it does not
126. The supreme court in Shingleton v. Bussey cited Bergh v. Canadian Universal Ins.
Co., 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1968), a medical malpractice case, to "emphasize the importance that
an injured party plaintiff have the advantage of an ordinary litigant from the moment of
injury .... "
127. In a state where automobile liability insurance is compulsory, there would seem to
be a stronger basis for distinguishing between automobile insurance and other policies. It is
significant, however, that Wisconsin, the only jurisdiction limiting direct action to automobile litigation, does not make the purchase of automobile liability insurance compulsory.
WIs. STAT. ANN. ch. 344 (1958). Similarly, Florida has construed its Financial Responsibility
Law as noncompulsory. Lynch-Davidson Dotors v. Griffin, 182 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1966), construing FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1969).
128. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 1.
129. The standard policy used by casualty insurers on a nationwide basis provides: "No
action shall lie against the company . . . until the amount of the insured's obligation to
pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual
trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company." Tarpey, The
New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INs. COUNSEL J. 223, 232 (1966).
130. See Bish v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1952),
aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1953), revfd on rehearingper curiam, 217 F.2d 953
(5th Cir. 1955), noted in 13 LA. L. RFv. 495, 506 (1953).
131. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Michael v. St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 92 F. Supp. 140 (W.D, Ark, 1950).
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purport to govern events prior to its enactment; 32 this would be true of a
direct-action statute that declares preexisting obligations unenforceable in
the future.
In order to overcome the constitutional objection that retroactive direct
action constitutes an impairment of the obligation of contracts, Louisiana
courts have frequently construed the direct-action statute of that state as
procedural in nature. 33 The reasoning has been that since only the timing
of the remedy against the insurer is affected, the obligations of contracts are

3 4
not sufficiently impaired to bar retroactivity on constitutional grounds.
Wisconsin, although viewing direct action as procedural' 3 5 has nonetheless
barred direct suits on contracts predating the statute. 3 6

However, in light of the decision by the Supreme Court in Watson v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,3 7 there would seem to be no constitutional impediment to construing a direct action statute as both retroactive and
substantive. Although it held Louisiana's direct-action statute constitutional
against equal protection 38 and due process objections, 3 9 the Supreme Court
in Watson never reached the issues of the retroactive impairment of the
obligation of contracts because the statute in that case predated the contract.340
132.

Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation,

73 HARv. L. REv. 692 (1960).
133. Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935); Gager v. Teche Transfer Co., 143
So. 62 (Ct. App. La. 1932); Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer
Co., 18 La. App. 725, 138 So. 183 (Ct. App. 1932). However, some cases have construed the
statutory right as substantive. E.g., West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122
(1950).
134. Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So. 2d 297, 304-06 (Ct. App. La. 1951); Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 18 La. App. 725, 138 So. 183, 188 (Ct.
App. 1932).
135. E.g., Miller v. Wadkins, 31 Wis. 2d 281, 283, 142 N.W.2d 855, 857 (1966); Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 510, 41 N.W.2d 611, 612 (1950); Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis.
68, 72, 251 N.W. 465, 466 (1933). In construing the Wisconsin right for conflict-of-law
purposes many other jurisdictions have treated direct action as substantive. E.g., Marchlik v.
Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 330-32, 239 N.E. 2d 799, 801 (1968) ; Posner v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 244 F. Supp. 865, 868-69 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 595, 242
N.W. 329, 330 (1932).
136. Pawlowski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 193-96, 244 N.W. 611, 612-14 (1932), held
the insurer's right to conceal its presence from the jury was substantial.
137. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
138. Id. at 70. The Court held the equal protection argument to be "wholly void of
merit."
139. Id. at 72. "Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in affairs
beyond her boundary which are no concern of hers. Persons insured or killed in Louisiana
are most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for
them.... Louisiana has manifested its natural interest in the injured by providing remedies
for recovery of damages. Moreover, Louisiana courts in most instances provide the most
convenient forum for trial of these cases. But modern transportation and business methods
have made it more difficult to serve process on wrongdoers who live or do business in other
states .... [an injured litigant] but for the direct action law, could not get [his] case tried
without going [to another jurisdiction] .... What has been said is enough to show Louisiana's legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights of persons injured there. In view of that
interest, the direct action provisions here challenged do not violate due process."
140. Id. at 70.
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The language of the Watson opinion suggests, however, that retroactive
invalidation of no-action clauses would be upheld. 41 The determinative
factor of the decision was the substantial interest of Louisiana in protecting
persons injured within her borders.142 The Court has consistently held that
retroactive statutes are unconstitutional only when, upon balancing of the
state and individual interests involved, they are unreasonable. 1 43 If the
direct-action state can demonstrate a substantial interest - and Watson
indicates that the states do have sufficient interest -there should be no objection on account of retroactivity even though direct action might quite
literally impair the obligations of contracts.'To minimize constitutional objections and prevent the confusion that
has arisen in other direct-action states, a Florida direct-action statute should
set forth explicitly:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

45
the public purpose to be served by the statute;46
the retroactivity of the right;
whether such right is substantive or procedural;' 4 7 and
a severability provision as to retroactivity clauses. 48

To provide the greatest possible protection for the public, the statute should
be retroactive in application. Companion provisions preventing the insertion
of no-action clauses and clauses requiring the consent of the insurer to be
49
sued would also be desirable, though not absolutely essential.
JUSRIDICrION

Subject Matter
Both Louisiana and Wisconsin, seeking to afford injured residents the
greatest possible protection while avoiding objections of unconstitutional
141. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
142. Id. at 72.
143. Hochman, supra note 132, at 694-95. See, e.g., Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,
325 U.S. 304 (1945); League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).

144. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
145.
146.
147.
148.

See
See
See
See

SFDAS, Appendix A, Introductory paragraph.
SFDAS, Appendix A, 2.
SFDAS, Appendix A, 1.
SFDAS, Appendix A, 9.

149. These measures would serve the purpose of minimizing constitutional objection.
Where an insurer, in exchange for doing business in the direct-action state, consents to
direct action, there is no basis for later complaint. See Talbot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 76 So. 2d
76 (Ct. App. La. 1955). Moreover, in preventing the insertion of no-action clauses, the

direct-action state affects the "freedom to contract" instead of affecting existing "obligations
of contract." Decisions indicate that the state, because its retroactive power is somewhat
united, enjoys greater regulatory power in the former area. See Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v.
Phoenix Assurance Co., 210 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1968); Reliance Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Booher,
166 So. 2d 222 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). However, in light of Watson v. Employers Liability

Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), which suggests that the invalidation of no-action
clauses, standing alone, is within constitutional bounds, these provisions would seem superfluous.
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extra-territorial effect, have wandered through a virtual labyrinth of statutory
interpretation and revision. The problem can be best understood by looking
at four hypothetical situations involving a mythical direct action state.'6 °
(1) P, a domiciliary of Louconsin, is injured by D in an accident
occuring in Loucinsin. D is insured by X Company under a policy containing a no-action clause and issued in a state where such dause would
be valid. P brings suit against X Company in Louconsin.
(2) P, a domiciliary of Louconsin, is injured by D in an accident
occurring outside Louconsin. D is insured by X Company under a policy
issued in Louconsin. P brings suit against X Company in Louconsin.
(3) P, a domiciliary of Louconsin, is injured by D in an accident
occurring outside Louconsin. D is insured by X Company under a policy
containing a no-action clause and issued in a state where such clause would
be valid. P brings suit against X Company in Louconsin.
(4) A, a resident of a non-direct-action state, is injured in an accident
outside Louconsin. B, the tortfeasor is insured by Z Company under a
policy issued in Louconsin. A brings suit against Z Company in Louconsin.
In each of these hypothetical situations the availability of direct action is
dependent upon the interpreted legislative intent of the statute and the
constitutionality of the exercise of jurisdiction.
Where, as in hypothetical (1), the accident or injury occurs within the
direct-action state, there appears to be little difficulty. Both the Louisiana and
Wisconsin statutes contain provisions explicitly extending direct action to
out-of-state policies in this situation. 151 Moreover, the occurrence of the
accident within the direct-action state establishes sufficient state interest to
overcome constitutional objections. 52
The situation in hypothetical (2), where the accident occurs outside the
direct-action state, has been the main source of confusion. An examination
of the Louisiana and Wisconsin experiences is worthwhile.
Under Louisiana's Act 55 of 1930,113 direct action was available both for
accidents occurring outside the state, if the policy sued upon was written
and delivered in Louisiana, 5 4 and for accidents occurring within the state
whether or not the policy was delivered in Louisiana. 55 In 1950 the federal
150. The following cases are on their facts similar to the respective hypotheticals: (1)
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). (2) Michel v. Bahn, 207 So.
2d 150 (Ct. App. La. 1968); Miller v. Wadkins, 31 Wis.. 2d 281, 142 N.W. 2d 855 (1966).
(3) Kay v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 158 So. 2d 422 (Ct. App. La. 1964). (4) Cases with
facts similar to this situation seem not to have reached the appellate level. This probably
indicates that the nonapplicability of direct action stautes to these circumstances is generally
accepted.
151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:655 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. §260:11 (Supp. 1969).
152. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
153. La. Acts 1930, No. 55.
154. See Bouis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. La. 1950) ( sembl);
Hudson v. Georgia Cas. Co., 57 F.2d 757 (W.D. La. 1932) (dictum).
155. See Rogers v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. La. 1945);
Stephenson v. List Laundry & Day Cleaners, Inc., 182 La. 383, 162 So. 19 (1935); Robbins v.
Short, 165 So. 512 (Ct. App. La. 1936).
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district court in Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co.156 limited direct
action to Louisiana policies on two grounds: (1) that extra-territorial effect
would be unconstitutional if applied to policies of non-direct-action states;" 7
and (2) that the legislature had, by changing the wording of the statute
when reenacted as part of the Insurance Code, intended to so limit the
statute. 58 In 1951 the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, without
considering the constitutional issue, affirmed the district court's decision
solely on the basis of legislative intent.159
In response to the district court's decision in Belanger and while the case
was before the court of appeals, the Louisiana legislature amended the
statute by adding that the right to sue the insurer directly "shall exist
whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written and delivered in the
state of Louisiana or not... provided that the accident or injury occurred
within the State of Louisiana."180 Apparently, this was added to overcome
the Belanger presumption that the legislature did not intend to permit direct
actions on out-of-state policies. 61 The geographical restriction was added to
insure that Louisiana would have an interest in the litigation sufficient to
overcome any constitutional objection.162 Nonetheless, all cases arising since
the 1950 amendment have read the geographical restriction as qualifying the
entire statute and have refused to allow direct action when an accident occurs
outside Louisiana, even where the policy was issued in Louisiana. 63 When
an accident occurs in Louisiana, however, it does not matter that the policy
was issued in another state. 64
In Wisconsin, a series of decisions and revisions similar to that of Louisiana
has occurred.'- However, in response to a court decision limiting direct action
in all cases to accidents occurring within Wisconsin, 66 the Wisconsin Legislature in 1967 amended its direct-action statute to apply the geographical
restriction only to out-of-state policies. 1 7

156. 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. La. 1950).
157. Id. at 739.
158. Id. at 737-38. La. Acts 1930, No. 55 stated: "It shall be illegal for any company to
issue any policy against liability ...." (Emphasis added.). The Insurance Code changed

the language to read: "No policy or contract of liability insurance shall be delivered in this
State .... La. Acts 1948, No. 195, §14.45 (emphasis added).
159. Belanger v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 188 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1951). The opinion
seemed to assume, however, that direct actions for accidents occurring outside the state
would come within the statute if the policy sued upon were issued in Louisiana.
160. La. Acts 1950, No. 541 (emphasis added).
161. Note, Civil Procedure-Louisiana Direct Action Statute-Accidents Outside State,
42 TUL. L. REv. 883, 884-85 (1968).
162. Id. at 885.
163. See, e.g., Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961); Nicholson v. Atlas Assurance
Corp., 156 So. 2d 245 (Ct. App. La.), cert. denied, 245 La. 461, 158 So. 2d 612 (1963).
164. See, e.g., Talbot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 76 So. 2d 76 (Ct. App. La. 1955).
165. In chronological order see Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611
(1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. §260.11 (i) (1959); Miller v. Wadkins, 31 Wis. 2d 281, 142 N.W. 2d
855 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §260.11 (Supp. 1969).
166. Miller v. Wadkins, 31 Wis. 2d 281, 284, 142 N.W.2d 855, 856-57 (1966).
167. Wis. STAT. ANN. §260.11 (Supp. 1969).
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If hypothetical (2) were to occur in Louisiana, P would have no right of
direct action; in Wisconsin P would have such a right. The Wisconsin
approach seems better conceived for purposes of protecting the injured directaction resident. Moreover, since the Supreme Court decision in Watson v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 18 the earlier presumed constitutional
objections would not seem to be an obstacle.
Hypothetical (3) is a situation in which neither the accident nor the
insurance policy can be linked to the direct-action state. It has been argued,
however, that the mere domicile of the injured party in the direct-action state
provides sufficient state interest for assuming jurisdiction. 169 Courts could
dispose of cases where the sufficiency of state interest is questionable by use
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens or simply by interpreting the directaction statute inapplicable."0
In hypothetical (4), where neither the accident nor the injured plaintiff
can be linked to the direct-action state, a consideration other than constitutionality becomes determinative. Even assuming that the issuance of the policy
in the direct-action state might provide an interest sufficient for jurisdiction
by the direct-action state, it can be argued that extending direct action to
this situation would be unwise, since it might open the door to making the
direct-action state a national center for tort litigation*"'x The ability of
insurers within the direct-action state to contract outside the direct-action
jurisdiction would thus be unnecessarily fettered. Moreover, the primary
purpose of direct action, the protection of injured residents, would not be
served.
Therefore, it is suggested that direct action in Florida be allowed in all
cases where: (1) the injured party is a domiciliary of Florida; or (2) where
the accident occurs within Florida. Direct action should not be permitted
where the only connection with Florida is the issuance of a policy in this
72
state.1
Service of Process
Having established subject matter jurisdiction, an injured party, unable
to obtain service upon the insured tortfeasor, may be able to litigate in the
direct-action state by suing an accessible insurer. This is a purpose of direct
action."'3 Where it can be established that the insurer maintains constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with the direct action state, there should be
no bar to service of process.' 74 Even if jurisdiction is based on as little as a

168. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
169. Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems,
74 HARv. L. Rav. 357, 361 (1960).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 360.
172. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 2. The effect would be to allow direct action only in
hypothetical Nos. 1, 2, and 3 set forth in text accompanying note 150 supra.
173. It is assumed here that joinder is not compulsory. See text accompanying notes
196-220 infra.
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single policy written within the direct-action state, constitutional requirements would apparently be satisfied. 172
Where the insurer has written no policies within the state, but is linked
thereto only by the tortious conduct of the insured, it is not clear whether
he can be served. It has been argued that an analogy exists between mailorder insurance cases, where the mailing of policies into a state has made the
insurer amenable to service17 6 and situations where the insured tortfeasor
comes into the direct-action state.177 However, the fortuitousness of the
insured's entering the state seems to distinguish the situation from mail-order
insurance.178
Despite objections to service that is justified only by the writing of
a policy in the direct-action state, at least one case has permitted such
process. In Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 7 9 the
court, reasoning that the insurer had undertaken by the policy to defend
the insured in whatever jurisdiction the insured might be sued, held that no
undue burden was placed upon the insurer by defending the action in its
own right.
Where the insurer's only contact is the tort of the insured, it has also
been suggested that the long-arm statute of the direct-action jurisdiction be
utilized to obtain service of process over the insurer.180 This method of obtaining personal jurisdiction over defendant tortfeasors was approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski.'18 It is based on the theory
that a person using the highways of the forum state, or committing a tort in
the state, may legitimately be required to appoint some designated state official
as his agent to receive service. 8 2
There are conceptual and practical considerations, however, that make
the utilization of long-arm statutes against the insurer questionable. First,
8 3
long-arm statutes are couched in terms of a quid pro quo arrangement.
For example, the out-of-state traveler, in exchange for the privilege of using
the visited state's highways, agrees to submit to service within that state. Of
course, it is all a fiction, but the fiction is more difficult to apply in the case
of the insurer. It is difficult to see what privilege the insurer derives by the
insured's journey into the direct-action state, unless the insurer can be said
to contemplate such journey upon entering into the insurance contract. Moreover, to view the insured as an agent for the insurer, and then to say that that
174. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
175. Note, supra note 169, at 362. See id.
176. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Parmalee v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953).
177. See MacDonald, Direct Action Against Liability Insurance Companies, 1957 Wis.
L. REv. 612, 612-16.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
State of

Note, supra note 169, at 326 n.39.
159 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. La. 1958).
MacDonald, supra note 177, at 624-26.
274 U.S. 352 (1927).
FLA. STAT. §§48.171, 48.19 (1969), provide for service upon the Secretary of
Florida.

183. See id.
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agent appoints another agent to receive service of process upon the insurer,
carries legal fiction somewhat further than reality may be able to withstand.
On the other hand, since the insurer under direct action may be regarded
as jointly liable with the insured, rs it is at least arguable that the use of the
long-arm statute is constitutional when applied to the insurer.1

5

Also, be-

cause of the peculiar importance of liability insurance in modem society, it
may be that the minimum contact requirements for service of process in
insurance cases should be less rigorous than in some other areas.188
A practical consideration in using long-arm statutes for purposes of direct
action is their limited applicability. Most such statutes apply only to motorists,187

and liability policies not falling within this category would not be

affected.

The problem of service upon an out-of-state insurer might be solved by
allowing the injured party to obtain such service in any state where the
insurer can be reached and guaranteeing the right of direct action to the
injured party in the foreign forum.,s s This could be done under the traditional theory of conflicts of law. Having created a new right of action against

liability insurers where no right previously existed, direct action would seem
to have created a substantive right rather than a procedural rule.189 Based

on this substantive right, parties injured within the direct-action state should
be able to bring direct action against the insurer of the tortfeasor in any
state in which they are able to serve process. 19° This could be accomplished
if the foreign jurisdiction applies the direct-action statute as substantive law
of the direct-action state under a conflict-of-law theory. Under traditional

choice of law principles, the only bar to this right would be a strong contrary
public policy in the forum state.191
In light of Florida's position as a center for tourism, it is likely that injured
residents will encounter problems with service of process. Situations where
184. This has been the effect of the Louisiana, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico statutes.
E.g., Lumbermen's Mutual Gas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 51 (1954); Fraticelli v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 186, 187-88 (lst Cir. 1967); Shaw v. New York Fire &
Marine Underwriters, Inc., 252 La. 653, 654-58, 212 So. 2d 416, 418 (1968). See Lubow v.
Morrissey, 13 Wis. 2d 114, 108 N.W.2d 156 (1961); Sievert, The New Insuring Agreement
and the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 33 INs. COUNSEL J. 418 (1966).
185. See MacDonald, supra note 177, at 624-26.
186. Note, supra note 169, at 362.
187. FLA. STAT. §48.171 (1969), applies to out-of-state motorists. FLA. STAT. §48.19 (1969),
applies to out-of-state watercraft.
188. MacDonald, supra note 177, at 619-23.
189. See Posner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 865, 868-69 (N.D. Ill. 1965). But cf.
Finn v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 141 So. 2d 852, 864 (Ct. App. La. 1962); Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 513-15, 41 N.W.2d 611, 614-15 (1950).
190. Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), is the first case to
apply Shingleton v. Bussey in a forum outside of Florida.
191. Some non-direct-action forums, although viewing the right of direct action as
substantive, have refused to apply the law of the direct-action state, holding it to be
contrary to the public policy in the forum. E.g., Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d
327, 333-34, 289 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1968); Lieberthal v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 316 Mich. 37,
41-43, 24 N.W.2d 547, 548-49 (1946). Contra Reishus v. Maryland Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 776
(7th Cir. 1969).
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nonresidents are insured by out-of-state insurers writing no policies within
Florida and are inaccessible to service of process may be easily anticipated. Unless the insurer can be served, the primary advantage of direct action is negated.
Because of inherent problems, the utilization of Florida's long-arm
statutes is not recommended. It is suggested instead that Florida recognize
by statute the substantive nature of the right of direct action.192 This may
afford the injured resident a modicum of protection by enabling him to pursue his right of direct action in foreign jurisdictions. It is, of course, possible
that other forums may choose to characterize the right as procedural anyway.
Statutory characterization of the right as substantive will, however, preempt
legitimate doubt in a foreign forum's interpretation of the statute. Unfortunately, it will also provide a strong argument for denying direct action
in a Florida forum where the cause arose in a non-direct-action state. Where
the plaintiff is a domicilliary of Florida and the cause arises in a non-directaction state, the resulting tension between traditional choice of law rules
(which would apply the substantive law of the non-direct-action state) and
the proposed direct-action statute could be resolved by using either a
traditional public policy approach or modem choice of law theories to choose
Florida law.
Diversity
One early advantage of direct action was the plaintiff's ability to create
federal jurisdiction by proceeding solely against the out-of-state insurer even
though the plaintiff and the insured were residents of the same state.193 However, the resultant backlog of cases in the federal courts prompted an amendment to the federal diversity statute, which obviated this possibility.1 4 That
amendment declares that, for diversity purposes, the citizenship of the insurer
is the same as that of the insured. Although the amendment has been attacked
as inconsistent with the purposes of federal jurisdiction,9 r its present applicability is dear.
T

THE PnoBL M OF JOINDER

A major question raised by direct action is whether the plaintiff must
join the insurer and insured, or whether he may proceed separately against
each. Most direct-action jurisdictions, viewing the insured and insurer as
jointly and severally liable, 196 have treated joinder as permissive. 97 The
192. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 1.
193. See Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 US. 48 (1954).
194. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (c) (1964).
195. See Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment: Congressional Indirect Action
Against State "Direct Action" Laws, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 268 (1965).
196. See, e.g., Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1967)
(Puerto Rico); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran &- Co., 251 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1966),
aff'd, 383 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1967); Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611
(1950) (semble). Cf. Behling v. Rivers, 74 F. Supp. 350, 352 (E.D.S.C. 1946).
197. E.g., Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Co., 375 F.2d 186, 187-88 (1st Cir. 1967)
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although there are indications
question is presently unanswered in Florida,2
90
that Florida trial courts, in construing Shingleton v. Bussey., view joinder
200
However, at least one district court of appeal has held
as compulsory.
joinder permissive.-'
The very vitality of direct action is in one way dependent upon noncompulsory joinder. If joinder is not permissive, and both the insured and insurer
are considered "indispensable" as opposed to "necessary" parties, 20 2 the
injured party may bring his action only in a forum wherein jurisdiction can
be obtained over both the insured and the insurer.20 3 This would not only
emasculate the jurisdictional advantage of direct action, but also leave the
plaintiff in a worse position than he occupied prior to direct action because
his pre-direct-action right to proceed solely against the insured would be
denied.
If only the insured is viewed as an indispensable party, the plaintiff's
burden ceases to be so onerous. He is returned to his pre-direct-action status
and may proceed against the insured alone; however, he is still deprived of
direct action's jurisdictional advantages, since the easily accessible insurer
4
becomes protected when the insured is not susceptible to process.
In short, the effectiveness of direct action, in providing a source of compensation for the plaintiff, seems to require that neither the insured nor the
insurer be considered indispensable parties. Moreover, it is arguable that
under direct action neither insurer nor insured need be regarded as indispensable parties within the traditional definition of the term. As defined by the
United States Supreme Court in Shields v. Barrow,-5 indispensable parties
are "persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest
of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting
that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience."' s
Although the insurer definitely has an interest in the action, there is no
apparent reason why an effective final decree, compatible with good con-

(Puerto Rico); Tillman v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 207 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1953)
(Wisconsin); Finn v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 141 So. 2d 852 (Ct. App. La. 1969).
198. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969), holds that the insurer is now a
real party in interest within the meaning of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210 (a). Since this rule has
been consistently construed as permissive, see, e.g., Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla.
1952), joinder under direct action may be necessarily permissive.
199. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
200. A poll of circuit court judges in Florida indicates that, of the 43 responding, 33
required joinder of the insured. Ferrero, An Advocate Examines the Ramifications of
Shingleton v. Bussey, 93 J. ACADEMY FLA. TRiAL LAwYEms Nov. 1969, at 2, 12.
201. Maxwell v. Southern Am. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 768, 770 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
202. See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
203. See James, Necessary and Indispensable Parties, 18 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 68, 75-76
(1963). In Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954), where the plaintiff
sued the insurer alone in federal court, it was held that the insured was not, for diversity
purposes, an indispensable party.
204. See James, note 203 supra.
205. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
206. Id. at 139.
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science, cannot be rendered in a case where the plaintiff chooses to sue the
insured alone. Indeed, this has been done for years on the theory that the
plaintiff becomes by the first judgment a judgment creditor of the insured.07
Since the insurer and insured are regarded as jointly and severally liable to
the injured party, 208 the judgment creditor theory is no longer workable when
the insured is sued alone under direct action. However, the theory of collateral
estoppel should serve to bind the insurer effectively on the question of the
insured's liability.209 Such a final, effective decree does not seem inconsistent
with good conscience since the insurer had the ability to control the defense
2x
of the action against the insured. 1
Where the plaintiff chooses to sue the insurer alone, there is a strong
argument for considering the insured indispensable. Since the insured would
have no right to control the litigation, binding him through collateral estoppel
with an adjudication of his negligence in the action against the insurer
alone, would smack of inequity. However, there is no need to apply collateral
estoppel where it would operate unjustly.2 " Thus, if the insured were not
bound by the earlier determination of his negligence, he might relitigate
that issue if sued in a second action by the plaintiff. At the same time, the
judgment in the first action would be effective only to the extent of the policy
limits of the insurer. Here, as in the situation of the insurer above, there
seems to be no compelling reason for considering the insured an indispensable party.
Unlike compulsory joinder, permissive joinder promotes the jurisdictional
advantages of direct action. If either the insured or insurer is unavailable,
the plaintiff is able to sue the accessible party. However, under direct action
a new cause of action is created to remedy a given wrong2' 2 without a corresponding elimination of the old remedy; therefore, duplicative litigation may
result.213 This would not only be inequitable but also it would promote the
same multiplicity of suits, circuity of action, and undue delay that direct
action was created in part to prevent. 2 4 Clearly it is both unfair and wasteful
207. 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRArcE §4831 (1962). See Grain Dealers Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Quarrier, 175 So. 2d 83 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Conley v. Singleton, 171 So. 2d
65 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
208. See, e.g., Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 186 (lst Cir. 1967)
(Puerto Rico); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp 823 (E.D. La. 1966),
afI'd, 383 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1967); Cunningham v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 228 So. 2d 700,
703 (Ct. App. La. 1969); Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950) (semble).
Cf. Behling v. Rivers, 74 F. Supp. 350, 352 (E.D.S.C. 1946).
209. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 329 (1896);
Lawrason v. Owner's Auto Ins. Co., 172 La. 1075, 136 So. 57 (1931), appeal dismissed, 284
U.S. 591 (1931). This is essentially the pre-direct-action situation. Only the theory changes.
210. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 329 (1896);
Lawrason v. Owner's Auto Ins. Co., 172 La. 1075, 136 So. 57 (1931), appeal dismissed, 284
U.S. 591 (1931).
211. REsTATEztENT OF JUDGMENTS §70, Comment f (1942). See Commissioner v. Sunnen,
333 U.S. 591 (1948); Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
212. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 51 (1954).
213. Note, supra note 169, at 367.
214. Note, The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 22 LA. L. REv. 243, 246 (1961).
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to permit a plaintiff, after losing in an action against the insured, to take a
"second shot" at recovery by suing the insurer.21 5
One means of preventing such duplicative litigation would be to consider
the plaintiff's remedies as alternative rather than cumulative, and thus force
the plaintiff to elect his remedy at the outset.21 This would seem harsh,
however, in cases where the first judgment proves unsatisfiable or is lost on
the basis of a defense that would not be available to the defendant in the
second action - especially if jurisdiction over the second defendant was unavailable at the time of the first action.217
The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides another means of preventing
duplicative litigation. By denying relitigation of previously decided issues,
collateral estoppel would be an effective, although complex, method of reducing duplicative litigation of issues; however, it would not entirely eliminate
multiplicity of action. Where the plaintiff, for instance, proceeds first against
the insured and loses, collateral estoppel would prevent his relitigating the
issue of the insured's negligence. Should the plaintiff win in the first action,
however, there is nothing to prevent him from seeking satisfaction from the
21
insurer on the basis of the policy coverage.
While compulsory joinder seems wholly unacceptable insofar as it nullifies
the jurisdictional advantage of direct action, unlimited permissive joinder

gives rise to multiple actions and many unnecessary complexities of collateral
estoppel. A better approach is to view the insurer and insured as merely
"necessary" parties,219 and to require joinder except where such requirement
would deprive the plaintiff of jurisdiction within the direct-action state. 220
DEiFaisEs
Personal Immunities
In both Wisconsin and Louisiana it has been held that the liability of the
insured is prerequisite to any liability of the insurer, even though the insurer

215. There should, however, be no objections to a second suit against either insurer or
insured where the plaintiff wins in the first suit. It may be that in the first action against
the insurer the policy limits prevented the plaintiff from obtaining full compensation. It
may also occur that, where the first action is against the insured, the insured's insolvency
prevents satisfaction. In either circumstance it would seem unfair to deny to the plaintiff
his second action. The second defendant can be adequately protected by setting off the
amount collected in the first trial.
216. This has been suggested in some decisions: Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert,
848 U.S. 48, 52 (1954); Lews v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465, 474 (W.D. La.
1952) (dictum); Emmco Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 287 La. 286, 290, 111 So. 2d 115, 117

(1959) (dictum).
217. Note, supra note 169, at 367-68. See note 215 supra.
218. The number of such dual actions might of course be reduced by the ability of
the insured to implead the insurer, FED. R. Civ. P. 14, and by the ability of the insurer to
intervene, Fmn. R. Civ. P. 24.
219. See 3A J. MooRE, FEDmAL PRAcrIcE §1919 (2d ed. 1968); James, note 203 supra.
220.

See SFDAS, Appendix A, f1.
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may be sued alone.221 Consequently, the insured's defenses of contributory
negligence and the running of the statute of limitations have been avail
22
to the insurer.222 Louisiana, however, has also held that governmental,

3

charitable, 224 and interspousa 225 immunities are personal to the insured and
therefore unavailable to the insurer in direct action cases. This represents a
potential problem area for Florida. Although Florida does not currently
227
recognize charitable22s immunity, it has preserved intrafamily immunity
and governmental immunity.228 The question thus arises as to the propriety
of denying these immunities to an insurer.
The generally recognized purposes of intrafamily and governmental immunities are, respectively, the preservation of family harmony and the protection of the public fund.229 Louisiana and some non-direct-action states
have apparently questioned whether the purposes of these immunities are
served where the insurer is the defendant.2' ° This reconsideration is exemplified by statutes waiving governmental immunity to the extent of liability
coverage. 231 On the other hand, it has been contended that to deny the insurer
these immunities, especially intrafamily immunities, leaves the insurer vulner23
able to collusive suits.

2

221. Musmeci v. American Auto Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 496, 501-02 (Ct. App. La. 1962);
Gager v. Teche Transfer Co., 143 So. 62 (Ct. App. La. 1932). Compare St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Burchard, 25 Wis. 2d 288, 130 N.W.2d 866 (1964), with Schwenkhoff v.
Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 11 Wis. 2d 97, 104 N.W.2d 154, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 903
(1960), and Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950).
222. See Grimes v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 145 So. 2d 62 (Ct. App. La. 1962);
Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639 (Ct. App. La. 1960); 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 207,
§4812. Louisiana has, however, denied the insurer the defense of imputed contributory
negligence. See McDowell v. National Sur. Corp., 68 So. 2d 189 (Ct. App. La. 1954),
appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
223. Musmed v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 496 (Ct. App. La. 1962).
224. Stamos v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. La. 1954).
225. LeBlanc v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 202 La. 857, 13 So. 2d 245 (1943); Dowden
v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 399 (Ct. App. La. 1963).
226. Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
227. See Denault v. Denault, 220 So. 2d 27 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Meehan v. Meehan,
133 So. 2d 776 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961) (fact situations strongly hint that a liability insurer
is involved).
228. FLA. STAT. §455.06 (1969) (waives governmental immunity to the extent of
liability insurance coverage for certain governmental agencies operating motor vehicles).
In 1969 Florida waived governmental immunity for one year, FLA. STAT. §768.15 (1969).
This statute has lapsed by its own terms.
229. See Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So. 2d
776 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
230. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Boulder Colo. Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835
(1939); Le Blanc v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 202 La. 857, 13 So. 2d 245 (1943); Musmed
v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 496 (Ct. App. La. 1962); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va.
17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
231. FLA. STAT. §455.06 (1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. §41-3505 (1961); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §40-4402 (Supp. 1969); N.H. RPv. STAT. ANN. §412:3 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,

§1403 (Supp. 1969).
232. Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems,
74 HAxv. L. REV. 357, 365 (1960).
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It must be remembered that the growth of direct action has been governed
by the balancing of several public policies. 33 In the area of immunities, the
insurer's freedom to contract is set against the desire to compensate injured
persons. Although a legislature could easily strike a different balance, it is
suggested for any Florida legislation that in this instance the insurer's interest
should prevail. To allow direct action to create liability where there was none
before appears excessive unless Florida is willing to adopt a no-fault insurance system. The liability of the insured should remain prerequisite to the
2
insurer's liability. 4
Policy Defenses
Traditionally, the injured party has stood in the shoes of the insured so
that any policy defenses the insurer might have against the insured could
be asserted to bar the injured party's recovery.235 The injured person for the
most part recovered, if at all, as a judgment creditor of the insured. 230 Since
the insurer under direct action is to be regarded as liable in its own right,
the possibility is raised that policy defenses may be substantially affected.
Even in non-direct-action states there has been a reluctance to deny compensation to the injured party because of the insured's breach of policy
conditions. 237 These jurisdictions, although recognizing the insured's ability
to eliminate the plaintiff's rights against the insurer, examine the nature
of the breach, closely scrutinizing its reasonableness and the good or bad
238
faith involved.
Louisiana's direct-action statute provides:"[A]n action may . . . be
maintained within the terms and limits of the policy .... 239 and policy
defenses, although closely scrutinized, have been allowed. 24° Wisconsin,
although viewing liability insurance as written for the benefit of injured
persons, 2 4' has allowed the insurer to utilize policy defenses.
233. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
234. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 4.
235. See Royal Indem. Co. v. Rexford, 197 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1952).
236. See Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936); 8 J. APPLEmAN, note 207
supra. It was also possible for the plaintiff, after obtaining a judgment against the insured,
to recover under the entitlement provision of the liability policy. See Peerless Ins. Co. v.
Sheehan, 194 So. 2d 285, 286 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967), where the entitlement provision of the
standard no-action clause provided: "Any person . . . who has secured such judgment . . .

shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this policy to the entent of the insurance
afforded ......
237. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Sheehan, 194 So. 2d 285 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Warren, 125 So. 2d 886 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961) (pre-direct-action Florida cases). See
generally Comment, A Solution to the Inequities from a Breach of the Cooperation Clause
in Automobile Liability Insurance, 2 HousToN L. REv.92 (1964).
238. Comment, supra note 237, at 95-100.
239. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §22:655 (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added).
240. E.g., Hallman v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 131 (Ct. App. La. 1963), afforded
the insurer a breach-of-notice defense where a default judgment had been obtained
against the insured. The decision distinguishes, however, between failure to give notice of
suit and failure to give notice of the accident.
241. Cf. Mueller v. American Indem. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 349, 120 N.W.2d 89 (1963).
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To deny the insurer some defenses, such as breach of the cooperation
clause, might open the way for collusion between plaintiffs and insureds,
especially where a family relationship exists. However, the insurer is afforded
some protection in that the insured may be compelled to testify in discovery
proceedings242 and called as an adverse witness at trial.243
It would seem that a distinction should be drawn between policy breaches,
such as fraud in procurement, which occur before the plaintiff's injury, and
breaches, such as failure to give notice and lack of cooperation, which occur
after such injury. Where the latter are involved the purpose of the policy
provisions should be kept in mind. They serve to protect the insurer's ability
to defend its interests effectively. 2 4 Therefore, as long as the policy breach
results in no substantial impairment of that ability the injured party should
not be defeated on the basis of that breach.
Where the breach occurs before the injury to the plaintiff, serious
theoretical difficulties arise. The question is often whether there was an
effective insurance policy at the time of the injury. Some writers have suggested that the insurer should not be able to avail itself of the breach unless
reasonable attempts to rescind the contract have been made prior to the
injury.2 "
It is submitted that for any Florida direct-action legislation the insurer
should not be denied defenses based on policy breaches occurring before the
event causing plaintiff's injuries, provided that the insurer has taken reasonable steps to rescind the policy sued upon. 24 Breaches occurring subsequent
to the insured's negligent act should not afford a defense unless the insurer's
ability to defend has been substantially affected thereby. 247 Where the injured
party himself gives notice to the insurer of the accident, the purposes of the
notice provision are served as well as if the insured himself had provided the
notice; therefore, where the injured party has given such notice within a
reasonable length of time after the accident, the insurer should not be permitted to successfully assert lack of notice as a defense. 24"

STATUTES

oF LIMITATION

Prior to direct action in Florida, it was held that a cause ex contractu
and a cause ex delicto could not be maintained in one action.249 Under direct
action such a combination is now permitted.250 This creates some peculiar
problems. Assuming that the plaintiff joins the insured and insurer in one
242.

F D. R. Civ. P. 26.
243. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Kador, 225 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1955). See American Fidelity &
Cas. Co. v. Drexter, 220 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1955).
244. See Comment, supra note 237, at 93-94.
245. Note, The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 22 LA. L. REV. 243, 249 (1961).
246. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 4.
247. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 4.
248. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 4.
249. Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936), overruled, 2g3 So. 2d 718
(Fla. 1969).
250. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So, 24 713 (Fla. 1969)..
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action, will the contractual or tort statute of limitations apply?251 Where
joinder is permissive, may a plaintiff whose claim against the insured is barred
by the statute of limitations for tort recover from the insurer under the longer
contractual statute of limitations period for contracts? Louisiana has solved
252
this problem by labelling the new cause of action as tortious in nature.
Puerto Rico acknowledges that the cause of action is in contract but applies
the tort or wrongful death statutes of limitation since the damage arises
from the commission of a tort.2 5 3 "This approach would place the insurer
and insured on equal footing by barring the direct action against the insurer
254
whenever the statute has run as to the insured.
Another question is whether the filing of an action against either the
insured or insurer tolls the running of the statute with regard to the other.
Louisiana has held that the statute is tolled.2 55 It has been contended that
to hold otherwise would disserve many policies promoted by direct action
since the plaintiff would be unable to join the insurer as a defendant after
bringing suit within the statute of limitations.- However, the Louisiana
approach appears neither equitable nor supportive of the purposes of direct
action, since it allows the plaintiff to unduly delay the determination of
the issues.r
CONCLUSION

This discussion of direct action has of necessity been dominated by considerations of public policy. Often, in discussing issues involved in drafting
a workable and fair direct-action statute, the author has been forced to make
policy decisions that could just as easily have been decided to the contrary.
Notable areas are the treatment of personal immunities, policy defenses, and
policy limits.
It is precisely because of these many complex and highly debatable policy
considerations that direct-action legislation is needed. If Florida intends to
expand the protections available to persons injured within her borders, the
expansion should be accomplished on a comprehensive basis.
In the balancing process, the interests of the insurer should not be taken
lightly. Since Florida already permits direct action, one very legitimate pur251. FLA. STAT. §95.11 (3) (1969) (five-year period on contracts); FLA. STAT. §95.11 (4)
(1969) (four years on tort); FLA. STAT. §768.04 (1969) (two years on wrongful death).
Thus, if the contract statute is applied to an action against the insurer, it would seem
possible to recover from the insurer as much as three years after the applicable tort
statute has run.
252. E.g., McDaniel v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 211 So. 2d 120 (Ct. App. La. 1968);
Soirez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 418 (Ct. App. La. 1964).
253. Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire 9- Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 186 (Ist Cir. 1967).
254. Note, Judicial Creation of Direct Actions Against Automobile Liability Insurers:
Shingleton v. Bussey, 23 VAND. L. REv. 631, 648 (1970). It is submitted that any directaction legislation in Florida take this approach. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 7.
255. Saxon v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 224 So. 2d 560 (Ct. App. La. 1969). Hidalgo v. Dupuy,
122 So. 2d 639 (Ct. App. La. 1960); Sewell v. Newton, 152 So. 389 (Ct. App. La. 1934).
256. Note, note 254 supra.
257. See SFDAS, Appendix A, 7.
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pose of direct-action legislation is to provide adequate safeguards for the
insurer. Direct action with such safeguards should work far less hardship on
the insurer than many have feared.
The suggested statutes set forth in the appendices are not intended to
provide ultimate solutions but to serve as illustrations. They are points of
departure for a legislative inquiry into direct action. An attempt has been
made to anticipate major problem areas. Ultimately, the legislature of
Florida must determine exactly, for each area, where the balance between
the countervailing public policies must be struck.
HowARw R. M.mSF_

APPENDIX A
SUGGEsTED FLORIDA DREcr AcrioN STATUTE

WHEREAS is is in the vital interests of the State of Florida to insure just compensation
for all persons domiciled or injured within the borders of this state, and WHEREAS it is
the public policy to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to insure every litigant the right
to an open, speedy, and realistic opportunity to pursue his adequate remedy of law, be
it enacted that:
(I) Any person who suffers damages or losses caused by the negligence of a person
insured under a liability insurance policy shall have the substantive right to join both
the insured and the insurer in one action. The injured party shall not bring action against
the insurer alone unless such injured party is unable to obtain service of process upon the
insured or, unless the injured party shall have first obtained a judgment against the
insured establishing said insured's liability under the law.
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(2) The right of direct action shall exist whether the policy sued upon was written in
this state or not, and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such
direct action, except that, where the policy of insurance sued upon was issued or delivered
outside the State of Florida, the insurer is by this section made a proper party defendant
only if the accident or injury occurred in the State of Florida. Moreover, the right of direct
action shall extend to all liability policies not otherwise excepted whether written or issued
before or after the effective date of this enactment. Nothing herein shall be construed so
as to allow a non domiciliary of this state, whose injuries shall not have arisen in Florida,
to sue the insurer directly in this state.
(3) Where, in an action brought under this section, the insured and insurer shall be
joined, such action may be brought in the county where the negligence occurred or in the
county of the insured's domicile. Where an action brought under this section is solely against
the insurer, such action may be brought in the county where the negligence occurred or
in the county where the insurer maintains a customary place of business.
(4) In defending an action brought under this section, the insurer may employ any
defenses available to the insured, including immunities, provided that the employment of
such defenses is not inconsistent with the laws of this state. The insurer may also employ
any defenses that would arise in a suit by the insured against the insurance company,
provided such defenses are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, and provided further
that such defenses arise out of a breach by the insured that substantially impairs the
insurer's ability to defend. In no case, may an insurer who has been given reasonable notice
by the injured party of the occurence giving rise to the action, assert the insured's failure
to give notice as a defense. Where any breach by the insured occurs prior to the negligent
act giving rise to an action brought hereunder, the insurer may employ such breach as a
defense, provided said insurer has taken reasonable steps to rescind the policy sued upon
prior to the insured's negligent act.
(5) The right of direct action set forth in this section shall survive the death of any
person entitled to bring suit hereunder, and may thereafter be brought by the heirs or
personal representatives of the deceased person, or others entitled to bring an action as
survivors according to law. Moreover, any insurer of the injured party who is by reason
of payment subrogated to the insured party's right of action may bring an action under this
section as though such subrogated insurer were the injured party.
(6) Where it shall appear in an action brought under this section that joinder of the
insurer interposes issues between insured and insurer likely to unduly complicate trial,
the trial judge may, on timely motion, sever such complicating issues between insurer and
insured for separate trial and adjudication. Moreover, such severance shall be granted
whenever it shall appear that a good faith defense by the insurer is in derogation of the
interest of the insured on the question of the insured's liability.
(7) Actions brought under this section shall be governed by those statutes of limitation designated by law as applicable to actions in tort, except that, where the injured party
has first obtained a judgment solely against the insured, an action against the insurer to
satisfy said judgment shall be governed by the statutes of limitation applicable to judgments.
An action brought solely against either the insured or insurer shall not, unless otherwise
provided by law, toll the running of the applicable statute of limitation as to the party
not joined in the action.
(8) In an action brought under this section, evidence relevant to questions of the
existence of insurance coverage shall be both admissible at trial and subject to discovery,
provided that, no undue emphasis upon the existence of insurance coverage shall be permitted at trial. Facts relating to the policy limits of the insurance sued upon shall be subject
to discovery but shall not be admitted at trial unless such policy limits are themselves
clearly in dispute. Nothing herein shall be construed to permit discovery of any assets of
the insured, where not otherwise permitted by law, other than those assets represented
by the insurance policy sued upon.
(9) If any subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence, or clause of this section is
held invalid or unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remaining portions
of this section.
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APPENDIX B
SUGGESTED

COMPANION

STATUTE TO

SFDAS

(1) No policy of liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in this state unless it
provides that the insurer consents to direct action as provided by Florida law, and the
insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured shall not release the insurer from liability for the
payment of damages for injuries sustained or loss occasioned during the existence of the
policy.
(2) Any judgment against the insured for which the insurer is liable under the policy
and which has become subject to execution, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the
insolven-y of the insured. An action may thereafter be maintained against the insurer,
within the terms and limits of the policy, by the injured person or his heirs, personal
representatives or other survivors entitled to bring an action.
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